INTERVIEW WITH DIPAK GYAWALI

Dipak Gyawali, former Minister for Water Resources, heads Nepal Water Conservation Foundation and is hydropower expert.
Gyawali spoke with Puran P Bista and Ghanashyam Ojha.

Excerpts

Q: Why did the Koshi breach its embankment? Who was responsible for the repair work-- India or Nepal?
DipakG: It is important to step back a bit to realize that this catastrophe happened because of the unholy confluence of three things: wrong technological choice for this kind of a hydro-ecological regime, wrong institutional arrangements resulting from the Koshi Treaty that are not right for managing this kind of a trans-boundary river system, and wrong conduct in public service over the last half-century, which includes aspects of corruption as well as what people in Delhi like to deride as “Bihari politics”, but has been an intrinsic part of Independent India. After all, when the British left India, Bihar was one of the most advanced states of India, Patna University one of the top universities (which helped found Tribhuwan University), and when my grandmother was ill in Taulihawa, my father and grandfather took her, not to Lucknow nearby or Delhi but to Patna for treatment because the hospital there was the best. Today can we say the same for Independent India's Bihar? I argue that this decline in Bihar's prosperity absolutely matches the rise in “Bihari politics” brought about in no small measure by the Koshi project.

But let us start with the technological aspect, when the lateral, left-bank embankment (not the barrage across the river) collapsed on 18th August: it was not a natural disaster, but a man-made tragedy. The river flow at the time was lower than the minimum average flow for the month of August, and hence not even close to a normal flood, which had not even begun during this monsoon. In the Koshi, it generally occurs from mid-August to mid-September, and when this natural stress is added to a man-made tragedy, together they have all the potential to become a major calamity of a generation.

Q: Why is this project the wrong technological choice?
DipakG: Koshi is one of the most violent rivers in the world because it is not just a river with water in it but also a massive conveyor belt of sediment from the Himalaya to the Bay of Bengal. This is a natural geological process that is responsible for creating not just Bangladesh but also much of Bihar out of the ancient Tethys Sea. Some one hundred million cubic meters of gravel, sand and mud flow out of Chatara every year. Lest we forget, all the collected water and matter brought by Tamor, Arun and Sun Kosi rivers, all the way from Kanchenjunga in the east, through Makalu and Everest to Langtang in the west have to pass through this one gorge at Chatara. And as the river slows down in the flat Tarai plains, the sediment settles down raising the river bed and forcing the river to overflow its bank before finding a new course.

This process has essentially created the inland delta over which the Koshi has swung from Supaul in the west to Katihar in the east, like a pendulum suspended at Chatara. In the last half century, this process has been arrested by “jacketing” the Koshi within embankments at the western extreme of the delta; but this has only forced the river to deposit all the sediment within this narrow “jacket”, raised the river bed, perching the river some four meters above the surrounding land. It was a recipe ripe for this kind of catastrophe to eventually happen, as it has now.

You have to be extremely careful when you start fooling around with such awesome forces of nature. What happens when you do so without proper understanding can be easily studied on the Tinau, south of Butwal: in 1961, India built the Hattisunde barrage on the Tinau's inland delta to supply irrigation water to Marchawar in the south, but the river changed course in the following year and the barrage has been standing high and dry since then, a tribute to man's stupidity, and an equally great tribute to his incapacity to learn from mistakes. You don't build such hydro-technical structures on an unstable delta fan, and the Koshi today is just Tinau repeated at a more massive scale.

Q: What do we know of the science behind these things?
DipakG: We have been studying the Tinau and its problems since the mid-1990s, which is just the same as the Koshi except at a much smaller scale. For the Koshi, the best example is the comparison of current river flow conditions of the lower Ganga with the map prepared in 1779 by Colonel Rennel for Governor General Warren Hastings. His map shows us that the Koshi actually joined the Mechi-Mahananda, which joined the Teesta. While the Koshi has swung west, the Teesta itself has swung east to meet the Brahmaputra, while the Brahmaputra has swung from meeting the Megna to meeting the Ganga. This shows how extremely volatile the dynamically shifting pattern of this region's hydro-ecological is.

This disaster was waiting to happen because the intervention into the natural regime through the Koshi project was bad science that ignored the problem of sediment in the river. As regards science, we should also remember that deforestation has really no significant linkage with Koshi sedimentation: we have more forest cover in the Koshi catchment today, thanks also to community forestry, than we ever did in our past history; and the Myth of Himalayan Degradation (that floods in Bangladesh are due to poor farmers in Nepal cutting trees) has been scientifically debunked over two decades ago. It is Himalayan geo-tectonics coupled with the monsoon regime that is the cause of Koshi sedimentation and floods, and that cannot be battled against with bad science and even worse policy prescriptions of indiscriminate embankment building following from such bad science.

Q: Can we repair the breach once the monsoon is over?
DipakG: I doubt it, simply because the breach now is no longer a rupture in the side embankment that can be plugged once the water level goes down and the Koshi starts flowing along its original main channel. What we are seeing is the main stem of the river itself flowing through it, capturing centuries' old channel and changing its course. To change it back is like damming the Koshi anew with a new barrage, in addition to making the river do a “high jump” of at least four meters to flow along its recently abandoned bed. Believe me, it won't be too happy doing that now or in the coming years, and will find some way to continuously breach the embankment in other weak spots, and no engineer can guarantee that this won't happen, although they will have lots of fun playing with all kinds of expensive toys “to tame the Koshi”.

The problem now is no longer just the breach at Kusaha in Nepal: it is totally uncertain where the new Koshi channel will be in the middle and lower delta in Bihar. Currently, satellite pictures show that it might be moving along the Supaul channel; but I think this might just be a massive ponding that is occurring with Koshi filling every depression, canal, old oxbow lake or the space between the indiscriminately built embankments. Since the land naturally slopes eastwards, depending upon whether the coming September floods are a four lakh cusecs flood or a nine lakh one (as happened in 1968) the new Koshi could be as far east as Katihar. Even if it does not go that far this year, it is inevitable it will do so in the years to come. This river morphology dynamics has to be looked at before any new embankments or repairs of old ones can be considered.

Q: What might be correct technology then?
DipakG: First, let us put to rest another wrong technology, a high dam on the Koshi. It is wrong because it would take two or more decades to construct, thus failing to address problems of current and immediate future concerns, is extremely expensive, does not address the primary problem of sedimentation (the reservoir will fill up too soon with Himalayan muck), has no convincing answer regarding the cost of attending to high seismicity in the region as well as diversion of peak instantaneous flood during construction (it is a major engineering challenge with no easy solution), and will create more social problems when indigenous population in Nepal have to be evicted from their ancestral homes. A Koshi high dam would be tantamount to Nepal importing downstream seasonal floods as permanent features of its landscape for questionable benefits to it. I think neither India nor Nepal is in a position to afford the technical, economic and social costs associated with it.

The immediate requirements of Nepal and Bihar (and by immediate I mean from now till ten or so years) will have to be met by new and alternative technologies suited to an unstable but very fertile flood plain. Such adaptive technologies with strong social components have been traditionally used by people in the form of houses on stilts and building villages with raised plinth levels that keep life and property safe but allow the flood to easily pass by leaving fertile silt behind. It will also call into serious question the current design practices in the transportation, housing, agriculture and other sectors, forcing the adopting of new approaches that look not so much to the watershed but to the 'problemshed' for answers. There is nothing called a permanent solution (how 'permanent' is a permanent concrete dam, after all?); but building houses on stilts is a cheaper, more 'doable' and thus a better solution.

Q: Why do you say that the current management setup of the Koshi barrage and embankments was a wrong institutional arrangement?

DipakG: The answer to that question can come from looking at the highly undiplomatic and breathtakingly ill-informed statement that came out from the Indian embassy in the immediate aftermath of the breach by blaming Nepal for it. When forcing the Koshi Treaty on Nepal in the 1950s, India took upon itself all responsibility for design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Koshi project, leaving Nepal absolutely no room to do anything except allow India to quarry all the boulders they like (which incidentally are rarely used in the Koshi but find themselves black marketed to all the aggregate crushers from Muzzafferpur to Siliguri!!)

The Koshi Treaty has been criticized very often for many reasons, but the reason some of us from the socio-environmental solidarity to criticize it is because of the neo-colonial mode that is built into its institutional make-up. Instead of a proper bi-national management arrangement, Nepal can only be a by-stander even for matters within its own territory: it can't order the opening of gates during floods or the supply of irrigation waters to its fields during the dry season. Everything is in the hands of the Delhi hydrocracy, which has conveniently (and to my mind, illegitimately) washed its hands off it by hiving it off to the Bihar hydrocracy. There is institutional irresponsibility built into the treaty at every level, which was seen at the time of its signing as a “construction” treaty rather than a management one, hence you can never get sustainable and scientific management out of it. In a tragic and perverse way, the current catastrophe has washed away the very foundations of that treaty and calls for revisiting the management of the Koshi in a more sane and equitable manner.

Q: What exactly did you mean by “bad conduct”, then?
DipakG: Even if you had a wrong institutional arrangement, right conduct could have still got things done more than semi-right. What happened here was that the entire Koshi project has become a synonym for the corruption that goes by the name of Bihari politics, which “New Nepal” seems to be importing with glee. Consider the following quote from an Indian scholar studying the problem.

Such is the racket of breaches that out of the 2.5 to 3 billion rupees spent annually by the Bihar government on construction and repair works, as much as 60 percent used to be pocketed by the politician-contractors-engineers nexus. There is a perfect system of percentages in which there is a share for everyone who matters, right from the minister to the junior engineer. The actual expenditure never exceeds 30 percent of the budgeted cost and after doling out the fixed percentages, the contractors are able to pocket as much as 25 percent of the sanctioned amount. A part of this they use to finance the political activities of their pet politicians and to get further projects sanctioned. Thus the cycle goes on. [The result is that...] the contractor's bills are paid without verifying them. The same lot for boulders and craters are shown as freshly purchased year after year and the government exchequer is duped of tens of millions. Many of the desiltation and repair and maintenance works shown to have been completed are never done at all and yet payments are made....So much is the income of the engineers from the percentages that the engineers do not bother to collect their salaries.

(Fighting the Irrigation Mafia in Bihar, by Indu Bharati in the Economic and Political Weekly from Bombay in 1991, quoted by Dipak Gyawali in his book Water in Nepal/Rivers, Technology and Society, Zed Books, London and Himal Books, Kathmandu, 2001.)

This is what I mean by “wrong conduct”. My understanding, based on information filtering out of Saptari and Sunsari and on local FM channels, is that local cadres of ruling political parties got wise to the corruption practiced from across the border and began to demand a share, which was difficult for the Bihari contractors to agree to because of the high rake-in demanded by their traditional political and civil servant bosses in Patna and higher up. There were, it seems, tough negotiations going on before the start of the monsoon season, but no agreement could be reached. No formal approach was made by the Koshi officials to the most India-friendly government in power in Nepal because the issue to be resolved was not doing the work but sharing the booty. Which is why the complaint that the contractors had come on August 8 to strengthen the embankment but were not allowed to, itself begs the question: how come you come to do the repair works (if that is what you wanted to do) in the middle of the monsoon and not in January?

Q: What should be the priority now?
DipakG: There are three things needed to be done on a war footing in order of priority:

First, this is a major humanitarian tragedy of global proportions, and it should be attended to with an open heart, generous pockets and caring hands. If Biharis are coming into Nepal because that is where the only high ground is, they should be welcomed, all relief should be provided to them too, but a record should be kept and they must be handed over to the Indian government soon after the monsoon. It must be recognized that the displaced fifty thousand or so Nepalis are in all probability permanently displaced (over their village, the new Koshi probably runs and will do so for the forseeable future) and need to be housed in camps before a permanent settlement is found. Perhaps the now emptying Bhutanese refugee camps should be used for the purpose.

Second, a bridge should be constructed over the Koshi at Chatara on a war footing and the traffic along the Mahendra highway restored to connect east Nepal with the rest of the country as soon as possible. The current Kosi barrage bridge will in all probability remain as the Hattisunde barrage on the Tinau, a defunct monument of interest to future archaeologists; but even if restored, we will need a ferry system over the new Koshi channel before we can get to it.

Third, a serious public review and debate must ensue over the Koshi project and the treaty that brought about this catastrophe. The investigations and debate must be conducted jointly by civic movements in Nepal and India so that a sane path forward can be charted. Hydrocracies of both countries can contribute to this exercise, but their judgment and legitimacy are now in question, as is their hitherto unchallenged policy hegemony.

Issues and Episodes to Reflect On

SB Pun

Writer’s Note:

This article appeared in Nepal Electricity Authority’s bi-annual magazine, Vidhyut, in Falgun 2063 (January 2007). Much water has flowed down the Kosi Barrage since then. With the August 18, 2008 breaching of the left embankment near Kusah, about 12 kilometers upstream of the barrage, the flooded Kosi river appears to be settling down to one of its old original courses. The Kosi termed the ‘Sorrow of Bihar’ has also become the ‘Sorrow of Nepal’. With about 50,000 people affected in Nepal and a far larger number (reportedly about 2 million) in India, the worst hit districts are Nepal’s Sunsari and Bihar’s Supaul, Madhepura, Saharsa and Araria. Nepal’s Dr. Ananda Bahadur Thapa had been consistently warning of such a Koshi disaster in his articles for the last decade or so. Similarly, Bihar’s Dinesh Kumar Mishra, a staunch anti-embankment crusader who wrote about the nexus between Bihar’s bureaucrats, politicians and contractors, merely quipped philosophically, ‘The inevitable has occurred.’

While the calamity and woes of people on both sides of the border were horrendous, the governmental arms of the two countries (the Embassy of India in Kathmandu and Nepal’s Ministry of Water Resources bereft of the Minister) sadly engaged in vicious recriminations, blaming each other for the breaching of the Koshi embankment. As usual politics, both in India and Nepal, also raised their ugly heads. Many are amazed at the slow response of the Indian administration that took nearly a week to comprehend that this was not the usual Koshi flood but the Koshi river rampaging along a new course. It is reported that Koshi, meandering through one of its old channels, has finally joined up with the Ganges near Kursella, after a lapse of over ten days. This is, however, not the time to indulge in mudslinging at the expense of the suffering people. This is also not the time to raise the issues of Kosi Treaty Revision, Sapta Koshi High Dam or even Prime Minister PK Dahal’s Beijing/Delhi visits. This is the time for the two countries to put their heads together, pool in all their resources and mitigate the sufferings of her people. Once some kind of normalcy is restored (probably by March/April of 2009), people return to their villages and towns (many would see no signs of their houses) and tempers subside, future course of actions must be vetted in a completely transparent manner. There should be no gunboat diplomacy or the grand designs of the past. The following is a litany of the past Indo-Nepal relationship on the Koshi river which, perhaps, could be a beacon on what not to do in future. .

i) Kosi – Sorrow of Bihar:

a) Kosi – a Tributary of Brahmaputra: In the last 250 years, the Kosi river has shifted from Purnea in the east to Saharsa in the west over a distance of 112 kms destroying over 15,000 sq. kms of fertile lands and villages in Bihar. Kosi has, thus, been named the “Sorrow of Bihar”. The Kosi engaged the British scientific minds right from the beginning of their colonial rule in India. Dr. B Hamilton, in early 1800, after studying the extensive morphological behaviour of the river, observed “In times of remote antiquity, the Kosi passed south-east and thence towards the east until it joined the Brahmaputra, having no communication with the Ganga”.

b) Debate on No Embankments versus Embankments: In 1883, the colonial British-India government feared that Kosi may make a sudden change of direction and return to one of its former channels, far way to the east. WA Inglis, who was deputed to survey the region, made an interesting conclusion that “it was not advisable to make any attempt to interfere with the natural flow of the river”. In 1896/’97, the Calcutta Flood Conference also concluded that no structures were feasible to control Kosi with numerous channels. The conference, however, recommended short lengths of embankments that were put up at various places by various interested parties. The 1928 Orissa Flood Conference indicated that the existence of embankments increased the adverse effect of floods and recommended demolition of bunds. In fact, some zamindari bunds were demolished by the government despite their hue and cry. The 1937 Bihar Flood Conference centered on the “Embankments versus No embankments” debate with the Bihar Chief Engineer, Captain GF Hall, surprisingly pushing for the removal of all embankments on the ground that they did more harm than good. It was the 1941 report of Sir Claude C Inglis that brought Nepal into the Kosi picture. Sir Inglis concluded that the Kosi “swings” related to the river’s excessive silt load and proposed that this silt/sediment be check, if possible, upstream in Nepal. The then Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell, in 1945 referred the Kosi flood problem to the newly constituted Central Water, Irrigation and Navigation Commission for advice.

ii) Kosi High Dam Project – 1950:

After considerable field surveys and geological investigations, a multipurpose project (783 feet high dam at Barahchhetra to moderate floods, 1,800 Mw of hydropower, a barrage at Chatara to irrigate 38.4 lakh acres in India and Nepal, another 90 Mw hydropower on the Eastern Canal and navigation facilities in the reservoir and the river downstream) was prepared in 1950. This is the Barahchhetra project from where the Indian ambassador, CPN Singh, promised Mohun SJB Rana electricity at 2 paise per unit for Nepal. This led to the demise of Nepal’s Rs 1.8 crore plan to generate electricity at 6 Paisa per unit from the 20 Mw Gaidakot hydropower-cum-irrigation project in Nawalpur/Nawalparasi by diverting the Kali Gandaki waters through a tunnel. The 1951 Advisory Committee shifted the Chatara barrage 9 miles down to Belka hills and suggested a 35 mile long embankment to prevent western movement of Kosi.

iii) Kosi (Barrage) Project – 1953:

Shri Kanwar Sain, Chairman of CW&PC, after visiting the Kosi area felt that the barrage either at Chatara or Belkha would be unstable and regarding the high dam at Barahchhetra he felt that the investment of large fund was not justified due to insignificant flood moderation effect and low demand of generated power. The 1953 Kosi Project, thus, surfaced with the barrage at Hanuman Nagar 30 miles below Chatara with the embankments on both sides of Kosi being inescapable. The AC Mitra review report of 1957 on the Hanuman Nagar barrage concluded that the barrage, purely for the purpose of flood control, was not justified but if taken up for the purposes of irrigation and power, as contemplated by the project, would be useful for flood control as well.

India, in order to control Kosi - Sorrow of Bihar, had first prepared the 1950 Kosi High Dam Project at Barahchhetra with the barrage at Chatara. This in 1951 moved down to Belka hills and in the 1953 Kosi Project again moved southwards to Hanuman Nagar. It was this 1953 Kosi Project that the Indo-Nepal 1954 Kosi agreement embraced: “The barrage will be located about 8 miles upstream of Hanuman Nagar town.” In May/June 1954, a month after the initialing of Indo-Nepal Kosi agreement, the Government of India sent a team of two engineers, Mr. Kanwar Sain and Dr. KL Rao, to communist mainland China to study the embankments built to control the floods on the Yellow and other rivers in China. The visit resulted in some changes of Kosi project parameters. When actual construction did start in 1959 on the 1953 Kosi Project, the barrage again moved further south as indicated in the 1966 Revised Kosi agreement: “The barrage is located about 3 miles (8 miles in 1954 agreement) upstream of Hanuman Nagar town.” Thus the signing of the 1954 Kosi agreement, without having even finalized the sifting of the barrage itself, demonstrates how desperate and hurry India was in to have the agreement on Kosi “signed, sealed and done” with Nepal.

Preliminary works on the Kosi project started in 1955 with the construction of the 76 mile long narrow-gauge rail from Bathana-Bhimnagar-Chatara and Dharan to transport boulders. The eastern earth dam of length 6,218 feet with its eastern afflux bund of 43,000 feet (8.1 miles) and the western earth dam of 12,200 feet with its western afflux bund of 44,237 feet (8.4 miles) were all in Nepalese territory. Actual construction work on the 3,770 feet long 56 gated barrage started in 1959, 26 miles downstream of Chatara, and was completed in March 1963 (pre-flood) with the road-bridge over it. The submerged area due to ponding including the river bed in Nepal was 16 sq. miles (41 sq. kms). The barrage cost “Rs 236.2 million IC and flood embankments of 146 km and 123 km respectively were completed at a cost of Rs. 450 million IC.”

The salient features of the main canals are:

Kosi Eastern Main Canal: Gross command area in India 18,34,000 acres (i) main canal – 27 miles (ii) Murliganj branch canal – 40 miles (iii) Janakinagar branch canal – 51 miles (iv) Purnea branch canal – 40 miles (v) Araria branch canal – 36 miles (vi) Distributaries and minors – 1,694 miles.

Kosi Western Main Canal: Gross command area in Nepal and India 63,000 acres and 9,28,020 acres respectively (i) main canal in Nepal – 35.13 Km (ii) main canal in India lined – 56.5 Km and unlined – 20 Km.

iv) Kosi Agreement – April 25, 1954:

a) Political Environment: The April 25, 1954 Kosi Agreement was signed by Mahabir Shumsher/Nepal and Gulzari Lal Nanda/India during the premiership of MP Koirala. Analysts note the comment of American scholar, Leo Rose, on the prevailing political environment of Nepal: “It was CPN Singh, for instance, who was generally credited with having arranged MP Koirala’s appointment as prime minister in November 1951, whereas it had been generally assumed that his more popular half-brother, BP Koirala, would head the first non-Rana government.” The joke, therefore, among the Nepalese politicians of that time was: “When Nehru caught cold, MP Koirala sneezed.” Rose further added: “Sikkim’s autonomy was severely limited, both internally and externally. Bhutan’s internal autonomy was recognized, but India retained the right to ‘advise’ that state on foreign relations….New Delhi played a more active role in Nepal than in Bhutan during the first decade after independence.…” This “active role in Nepal” of New Delhi was clearly India’s policy to “steer” Nepal from some of its over-enthusiastic politicians. India, particularly, disliked the concept of Himalayan Federation that was broached a number of times since 1947. The federation was perceived as a Chinese concocted plot with the cooperation of the pre-1816 Gorkha Empire-minded politicians in Nepal. Tanka Prasad Acharya, during his tenure as prime minister, did pursue that concept but quickly dropped it as New Delhi’s reception was “distinctly hostile”. Therefore, it was no surprise that India “began to take Kathmandu too much for granted, and tended to act in a rather cavalier and condescending fashion with regard to their own prerogatives…”

b) Opposition to Agreement: The Kosi agreement aroused much bitterness in Nepal with the opposition parties accusing the government of bartering away Nepal’s future: Nepal receiving only a minute portion of irrigation, India benefiting more from power development, ruining of Nepal’s richest agricultural lands and Nepalese peasants discriminated in compensation. The greatest invective was directed at the supposed violation of Nepal’s sovereign rights over the Kosi project areas in Nepal. Many believe this was due to India’s inability to think of Nepal as a separate entity. India never tried to comprehend that she was taking away from a sovereign state the water on which her future depended. India could not or would not comprehend this until the Chinese attack of September 1962. That is why Leo Rose commented that the 1962 Sino-Indian border war was “a godsend to King Mahendra, but certainly not an unmixed blessing.” Sober present day Indians like Ramaswamy Iyer do admit that India has “on occasion been unimaginative, patronizing and insensitive in their dealings with the country’s smaller neighbours, and there have been brief aberrant periods when even the word ‘bullying’ might not have been out of place.”

c) Defense of Agreement: MP Koirala, however, staunchly defended his Kosi agreement saying: If one is determined to misunderstand a very plain situation, nobody ever can help him realize the fact. India could have very well put the barrage a couple of miles below the present agreed site, if it had no consideration for Nepal. The sovereignty and territorial rights of Nepal have not been impaired by the Kosi Agreement …… However, BP Koirala, MP Koirala’s own half-brother, just before becoming Prime Minister in 1959 told a press conference that “Nepal had lost from the Kosi project agreement and said that his government would be careful about concluding an agreement on the Gandak.” It is difficult to conjecture how well informed Prime Minister MP Koirala was on India’s Kosi Project. As he hailed from that area, he must have had, undoubtedly, a soft corner for it. But now even Indian ex-bureaucrats admit “…one suspects the Indian engineers did not fully explain the consequences in advance to the Nepalese authorities.”

But Indian diplomats like ambassador Deb Mukherjee continue to mouth the same arguments put forth by Prime Minister, MP Koirala, in 1954. At a Kathmandu Face-to-Face Reporters’ Club Program in May 26, 2001 Mukherjee maintained “If the Indians had built the Koshi barrage a little downstream in Bihar, then Nepal’s advantage would have been zero. And Indian irrigation instead of nine and a half lakh hectares would have been nine lakh and thirty five thousand hectares.”

d) Reality on Ground: This “consideration for Nepal and no advantage for Nepal if barrage was built in India” arguments put forth by both Prime Minister MP Koirala in 1954 and Ambassador Mukherjee in 2001 give one the impression of “magnanimity” on the part of India. However, this “consideration for Nepal” needs to be concluded only after perusing the following factual statistics on the ground:

The Kosi Barrage, entirely within Nepal, is so sited that it provides not a single acre of Nepalese land irrigation from the Kosi Eastern Canal. Instead, this Eastern Canal, that emerges from the barrage immediately into Indian territory, provides irrigation to 612,500 ha of land in India. The 20 Mw Kataiya powerhouse is on this Eastern Canal in India. The Kosi Western Canal, after traversing 35 kms of valuable Nepalese territory, provides irrigation to only 11,300 ha of Saptari lands through gravity flow and 13,800 ha with costly pumped irrigation. This was availed after much agitation by the Saptari farmers. On the other hand, the same Western Canal provides gravity flow irrigation to 356,600 ha of land in India.

Hence, the siting of Kosi barrage in Nepal “for Nepal’s consideration and advantage” is, to be blunt, an outright lie. Jagat Mehta, former foreign secretary of India, does rightly concede “An alternative location could have greatly increased the benefits to Nepal.” Prime Minister Nehru, though referring to the Gandak project straddling the border 50:50, was more honest when he said “India could build in her own territory but had proposed to build in Nepal because it was CHEAPER and would give Nepal water and power.” Though Prime Minister MP Koirala in 1954 may be given the benefit of doubt for being unaware of the project being “cheaper” in Nepal, ambassador Mukherjee in 2001 cannot be given the same benefit of doubt.

By constructing the 1.1 km (3,770 feet) long barrage within Nepal, India instead gained by not submerging a single sq. meter of her land in India. The Kosi barrage impounded-water with the afflux bunds submerges over 41 sq. Km (16 sq. miles) of Nepalese lands in perpetuity providing huge flood control and irrigation benefits entirely for India. As a part of Nepal’s Kosi project benefit, it is 48 Km upstream of the Kosi barrage that India built the Chatara Irrigation Project at a cost of US$ 20 Million to irrigate 66,000 hectares of Sunsari and Morang lands. The Chatara canals, completed in 1974, soon got deluged with Kosi’s excessive silt and were quickly made non-functional. Hardly had India handed over Chatara project to Nepal, the World Bank in 1978 was requested to rehabilitate and improve the same Chatara project under a different name, Sunsari-Morang Irrigation Project. This name change was reportedly to allay India’s sensitivity over the name, Chatara. The four phase 1978 to 2003 Sunsari-Morang project was to cost Nepal a dear US$ 155 million to irrigate a much reduced 41,800 ha

v. 1966 Revised versus 1954 Kosi Agreements:

Though of academic interest, it is worth comparing and ruminating over some of the more salient features of the old 1954 Kosi Agreement and the still applicable 1966 Revised Kosi Agreement:

a) On Use of Water:

With the wording “Without prejudice to the right of Government (Nepal) to withdraw for irrigation or any other purpose in Nepal such supplies of water, as may be required …The Union (India) shall have the right to regulate all the balance of supplies in the Kosi river…” it will be unfair to say that the old 1954 Kosi agreement did not give Nepal the full water rights over the Kosi river. But the 1966 Revised Kosi Agreement’s stipulations that India “shall have the right to regulate all the Balance of supplies in the Kosi river at the Barrage site” and that Nepal “shall have every right to withdraw for irrigation and for any other purpose in Nepal” made Nepal’s water rights legally foolproof and water-tight! In other words, unlike the Amended 1964 Gandak treaty, the Revised 1966 Kosi Agreement fully tight-sealed Nepal’s water rights. Nepalese water experts like Dr. Hariman Shrestha and Dr. Ananda Bahadur Thapa give this credit to Dr. Dante A Caponara, an Italian, who was at that time an FAO advisor to the Nepalese government. This right on Kosi waters did not necessitate the World Bank to give its riparian notification to India during the processing of Arun III project. Or for that matter, India’s concurrence is not required for executing such consumptive use project like the Melamchi Drinking Water. India has been putting its “queries” and blocking all donor financed consumptive use projects whether it is on Kankai, Kamala, Bagmati, Rapti or Babai.

b) On Use of Power:

On power, “The powerhouse on the eastern Kosi canal has been designed to produce 20,000 KW of which Nepal’s share would be 10,000 KW.” The “50 percent of the hydro-electric power generated at the Barrage site Power House” in the old agreement was qualified in the revised agreement by the need to communicate three months in advance “any increase or decrease in the required power supply exceeding 6,800 KW.” India apparently de-rated the capacity to 13.6 Mw due to heavy silt and trash problems thus requiring Nepal to inform India of any increase or decrease over 6.8 Mw. Both the old and the new revised agreement stipulate Nepal’s 50% power as being subject to “The tariff rates …. fixed by mutual agreement.” While many both in India and Nepal believe this Kosi power to be gratis, Indian bureaucrats have been consistently terming it as the “concessional Kosi power” which in 2006 was IC Rs 2.70 per unit (NC Rs 4.32).

c) On Royalties:

On royalties, both the old and the revised agreement have the same wording: “HMG will receive royalty in respect to power generated and utilized in the Indian Union at rates to be settled by agreement hereafter:

Provided that no royalty will be paid on the power sold to Nepal.”

While Nepal is sanguinely oblivious of the royalty she is entitled to, India too has remained silently mum for over three half decades!

Similarly for stone, gravel and ballast used in “construction and future maintenance of the barrage and other connected works” royalties will be paid to Nepal “at rates to be settled by agreement hereafter.”

On the royalty for stones and gravel collected by the District Development Committee, while India complains of royalty demands in Nepal by more than one authority, Nepal also complains that the stones and gravel for the Kosi project are being used for other purposes in India.

d) On Sovereignty and Jurisdiction:

For the Opposition political parties, this has been the major bone of contention and Leo Rose rightly pointed out that the “Kathmandu politicians and press soon discovered any number of flies in the ointment.” Hence, the wordings of the 1954 and revised 1966 agreements have been, for the sake of the readers, dittoed below in the “as it is” form:

1954 Kosi Agreement:

The Union (India) shall be the owner of all lands acquired by the Government (Nepal) under the provisions of clause 3 hereof which shall be transferred by them to the Union (India) and of all water rights secured to it under clause 4(i).

Provided that the sovereignty rights and territorial jurisdiction of the Government (Nepal) in respect of such lands shall continue unimpaired by such transfer.

The key objectionable words here are that India “shall be the owner of the lands” acquired for the Kosi project. The treaty, however, hurries to stipulate that sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction “shall continue unimpaired” by such transfer.

1966 Revised Kosi Agreement:

Lease of the Project areas:- (i) All the lands acquired by HMG under the provisions of clause 3 hereof as of the date of signing of these amendments shall be leased by HMG to the Union for a period of 199 years from the date of the signing of these amendments at an annual Nominal Rate.

(ii) The rent and other terms and condition on which lands for Western Kosi Canal shall be leased by HMG to the Union pursuant to this Agreement shall be similar to those as under sub-clause (i).

(iii) The rent and other terms and conditions of any other land to be leased by HMG to the Union pursuant to this Agreement shall be fixed by mutual agreement.

(iv) At the request of the Union, HMG may grant renewal of the leases referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon.

(v) The sovereignty rights and territorial jurisdiction of HMG, including the application and enforcement of the law of Nepal on and in respect of the leased land shall continue un-impaired by such lease.

Note: The black bold stresses are those of author only.

The 19th December 1966 Revised Kosi Agreement was signed by ambassador Shriman Narayan for India and by Dr. YP Pant, Secretary/Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance for Nepal. On Dr. Rose’s “number of flies in the ointment”, the author would like to pick on the following “flies”:

In the 1954 agreement, though the term “sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction … shall continue un-impaired” is there, it is the term “The Union (India) shall be owner of all lands” transferred by Nepal to India that was highly objectionable and interpreted as infringing on Nepal’s sovereignty. The 1966 revised agreement conveniently converted this objectionable ownership into the more palatable word lease. However, it is this lease that invited the incredible clause “199 years from the date of the signing of these amendments“. MP Koirala’s 1954 agreement had no such validity period. India incorporated another “fly” to this 199 years’ lease: “At the request of the Union, HMG may grant renewal of the leases”. Being a lease, India has now to pay Nepal rental amount carefully termed “at an annual Nominal Rate” that was missing in the 1954 agreement. Just eight years later in 1974, India and Bhutan signed the Chukha Project Agreement whose validity period, in striking contrast to Nepal’s Kosi agreement, was for 99 years. But the crudest “fly” in the Kosi ointment pertains to the content of the Letters of Exchange “….our two Governments have reached an understanding that the Government of India will be reasonably compensated in case the Project properties are taken over by His Majesty’s Government at the end of the lease period.” Present day Build-Own-Operate and Transfer projects like the Tala-Delhi 400 Kv transmission lines get transferred to the owner, Power Grid Corporation of India, in mere 30 years with no ‘reasonable compensation’ at all!

No doubt, India, as usual, has scored well on every count. Laxman Prasad Rimal, the then Water Resources Secretary, states that the ministry had recommended 99 years only but “later the official agreement amended it to 199 years”. This was King Mahendra’s “trade-off” with India, an acceptance not to support the Nepali Congress’s armed activities in India against his rule in Nepal. Jagat Mehta, India’s former foreign Secretary, now concedes “…after the dismissal of BP Koirala, we actually facilitated the use of Indian territory to raid Nepal…”. In fact, history, after the signing of Revised Kosi Agreement in 1966, is a testimony to this. BP Koirala did meet Indira Gandhi, did collect and store arms in India only to be persuaded by his mentor, Jaya Prakash Narain, to hand them over to the Bangladesh Mukti Bahini who were waging the Bangladesh liberation movement in 1971. It is also believed that India’s long term Nepal strategy forced BP Koirala to rethink his own policy vis-à-vis India to ultimately return to Nepal and announce his famous Reconciliation Policy (Nationalism and Democracy) in December 1976.

vi. Issues on 1966 Revised Kosi Agreement:

a) Kosi Concessional Power: The preamble to the 1954 Kosi Project states “…for the purpose of flood control, irrigation, generation of hydroelectric power and prevention of erosion of Nepal areas on the right side of the river…” Note the correct order of priority: flood control, irrigation and generation of power! India does concede that this first joint venture was “originally conceived as a flood control scheme.” This meant flood control and irrigation far outweighed power generation. “The powerhouse on the eastern Kosi canal has been designed to produce 20,000 KW, of which Nepal’s share would be 10,000 KW…..The barrage was completed in 1962 at a cost of Rs 236.2 IC and flood embankments of 146 km and 123 km respectively were completed at a cost of Rs. 450 million IC.” With the commissioning of the barrage in 1962 and the eastern canal in July 1964, Nepal’s 10,000 KW of power entitlement was to power the industrial towns of Biratnagar, Dharan and Rajbiraj in 1965. Unfortunately, the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war broke out and the ship carrying the Kataiya powerhouse’s Fuzi Electric Japanese electro-mechanical equipments were captured and confiscated by the Pakistan navy on the Bay of Bengal.

This 50% Kosi power of the 1954 Kosi Agreement materialized only on October 31, 1971 when the Kataiya power house on the Eastern Kosi Canal started generation. Ambassador CPN Singh had promised Mohun Shumshere in 1950 Kosi power at 2 Paisa per unit. This turned out to be the “concessional Kosi power” at IC 10 Paisa per unit in 1971, while the power exchanges at a number of Nepalese border towns were pegged at IC 14 Paisa per unit. There was much to be said on the quality of power from India. Nepal had no grumbles over the bad quality of power supplied under the power exchange rate to the border towns but she was very frustrated with the Kosi power quality to her industrial towns of Biratnagar, Dharan and Rajbiraj. Every evening even the concessional Kosi power was subjected to load shedding. In fact, so infuriated were the Biratnagar consumers with the erratic Kosi supply that whenever power failed everybody cursed Kasi Raj Pande with “Kasi Raj maryo!”

b) Unsustainability of “Kosi Concessional Power”: As early as 1988, India’s position on the “concessional” Kosi power was that “though the original capacity of the Kosi Power Station was 20 Mw it has been generating only to the extent of 1 to 2 Mw that also intermittently… the agreed tariff applicable for other locations should also be applicable to the power exchange at Kataiya….” Nepal, however, explained that “since decisions on the mode, quantum and related tariffs for supply of power under Kosi Agreement can not be taken at this level, the issues should be referred for a decision at the level of the two Governments.” Later in 1994 at the Second Power Exchange Committee meeting, India again “…made a strong plea for discontinuance of the concessionality in the tariff for power supply at Kosi point …generation from Kosi project should be at the rates applicable for supply at other points…”

This Kosi “concessional power” to be upgraded at par with the higher power exchange rate has been repeatedly and consistently brought up by India at the Indo-Nepal Power Exchange Committee meetings to this date. Some Nepalese officials even started to lobby in India’s favour arguing that the quantum of Kosi power is very small and Nepal might as well concede. Water Resources Ministry, fortunately, took the stand that it was not the “quantum of power” in question but the “principle” under which the two countries signed the Kosi Agreement. By 1999 under India’s persistent requests “revision of Tariff for power exchange under the Kosi Agreement” was agreed to be referred to their respective governments. At the Secretary level Indo-Nepal Joint Committee on Water Resources in 2004 though the Nepalese side took the stand that the “subsidized rate of power supply should be continued” India argued that “in view of shortfall in generation from Kosi Project, power had actually been obtained from other sources for supply to Nepal. Continuance of this arrangement was not sustainable.” Despite the lame “shortfall in generation from Kosi Project” excuse, which incidentally is of no concern to Nepal, India successfully constituted a joint group to analyze the issue under the Kosi Project Agreement and submit its recommendations. Thus Nepalese analysts marvel at the consistency and obduracy of the Indian bureaucracy despite the 16 year lapse from 1988 to 2004. That India does her homework well is amply illustrated by this example! It is only hoped that New Nepal also learns this Indian trait.

As of June 2006, this “concessional” Kosi power tariff at the 33 Kv voltage level is IC Rs 2.70 (NC Rs 4.32) per unit escalated at 8.5% per annum. India buys Bhutan’s Chukha power at the commercial tariff of IC Rs 1.50 per unit. The “concessional tariff” that India provides to her own farmers for irrigational needs is merely IC Rs 0.40 per unit at the low voltage level. Nepal’s “concessional Kosi power” import in the last five years is given below:

Fiscal Year Kosi Power Kosi Tariff Kosi Power Amount

million Units IC Rs/Unit in IC Rs

2005/’06 31.23 2.70 8.01 Crores

2004/’05 19.80 2.49 4.81 Crores

2003/’04 17.03 2.29 3.81 Crores

2002/’03 11.76 2.11 2.37 Crores

2001/’02 14.25 1.95 2.61 crores

Average annual Nepal utilized Kosi power:18.81MUs

Source: Nepal Electricity Authority.

Compare this concessional Kosi power import from India’s Kataiya substation with the higher priced Bhantabari-Duhbi import at 132 Kv level from the same substation:

Fiscal Year Bhantabari-Duhbi 132 Kv Power Exchange Power Imported

Million Units Rate in IC Rs/Unit in IC Rs

2005/’06 259.5 3.49 87.1 Crores

2004/’05 133.3 3.22 40.7 Crores

2003/’04 68.2 2.97 19.1 Crores

2002/’03 96.3 2.73 24.8 Crores

2001/’02 75.9 2.52 18.0 Crores

Average annual Bhantabari-Duhbi Nepal imported Power Exchange power:126.6 Million Units

Source: Nepal Electricity Authority

One thus sees the heavy import of thermal power from India by the hydropower rich Nepal. On the subject of this “concessional Kosi power”, there are two very important issues that Nepal needs to do due diligence:

Nepal’s contractual entitlement to receive on a continuous basis 10 Mw of Kosi power (50% of the installed capacity of 20 Mw), which works out to 87.6 million units per annum, at the “concessional rate” should be fully utilized. From the records above, it is seen that the average annual import is only about 19 million units. One can not justify why this withdrawal should be limited to the three 33 Kv feeders (Biratnagar I & II and Rajbiraj) only. Nepal should insist on the 10 Mw (87.6 MUs per annum) from the 132 Kv Duhbi-Kataiya voltage level. Nepal is merely asking for its due share from the Kosi agreement. India needs to be fair and equitable on this issue.

Nepal needs to undertake “due diligence” on Article 6 of the Kosi Agreement where “HMG will receive royalty in respect to power generated and utilized in the Indian Union at rates to be settled by agreement hereafter: Provided that no royalty will be paid on the power sold to Nepal.” For the last 37 years since the commissioning of the Kosi hydel station in 1971, Nepal has not received, or for that matter even bothered to claim, any royalty for the electricity generated and used by India on her soil through the water impounded in the Nepalese territory. Of course, this “power generated and utilized in the Indian Union” would need to be ascertained without acrimony from the 1971 till date log sheets that are in India’s Kataiya power house.

v. Sapta Kosi High Dam Multipurpose Project:

a) Alternative Project to Protect Kosi Barrage: It is now a fact that the newly 1988 built Tanakpur barrage was in true essence India’s “alternative project” to replace the outdated 1920 Sarda/Banbasa barrage. Similarly, India was waiting for an opportune time to propose to Nepal for an “alternative project” to protect its sediment-loaded, already-aged 1962 Kosi barrage at Hanuman Nagar. Immediately after the multi-party system took over the Nepal governance, India, at the 1991 Secretary level Indo-Nepal Sub-commission on Water Resources meeting at New Delhi, contended that the Kosi Barrage is a joint Indo-Nepal asset and that the barrage has “outlived its life and Kosi Multipurpose Project can only protect this asset.” Interestingly, India further pointed out at the meeting that the “utility of the project for flood control will be mainly confined within Nepal and India, and will not extend to Bangladesh.” Hence, India did not deem it “necessary to involve Bangladesh on the consideration of the Kosi Project.” Due to Kosi’s proximity to her, Bangladesh perceived the Kosi multipurpose project as a regional project to partner in. In fact in October 1986, a Joint Committee of Experts from India and Bangladesh had come to Nepal “hunting” for river data, wherein it was Bangladesh that proposed seven storages in Nepal to augment the dry season flows of the Ganga at Farakka. As Nepal, despite her request, was not included in that Joint Committee, she was forced not to comply with the Committee’s request for data on Nepalese rivers.

b) Inclusion of Sun Kosi-Kamala Diversion: The roadmap of the Kosi High Dam was clearly charted in the 1991 MOU during the New Delhi visit of Prime Minister, GP Koirala. The December 29, 1991 Nepal Gazette notification (Vol. 41 No. 36) states: Joint studies/investigations ….to finalise the parameters of the Sapta Koshi High Dam Multipurpose Project will be carried out expeditiously….joint committee of experts shall….finalise the modalities of the investigations and method of assessment of benefits…..the two sides will start the investigations of the project….to preparing a detailed project report at the earliest. The same gazette further stated that Nepal will prepare the feasibility report of Kamala and Bagmati Schemes with the “possibility of financing of the studies by India ..”. In 1996 during Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s visit to New Delhi, Nepal agreed to the Joint Team of Experts’ (JTE) meeting on Sapta Kosi High Dam with the satisfaction that Nepal’s Sunkosi-Kamala Diversion was included. Some argue that the inclusion of Sunkosi-Kamala Diversion with the Sapta Kosi High Dam was unfortunate as the Kosi Agreement gave Nepal every right to develop this Diversion independently to maximize Nepal’s own benefits first. Now India’s interests would have to be factored in.

c) Data of Bagmati and Kamala: no Joint Project Office in India: The JTE meeting in January 1997 agreed: to undertake study of Sun Kosi – Kamala Storage cum Diversion as well as the study of Kosi High Dam Project, to undertake navigation study from Chatara to Khursela at the confluence of Kosi with Ganga and agreed on the principles for calculating flood control, irrigation and power benefits. As per the decision of the fifth JTE meeting in June 2003, the Joint Project Office–Sapta Kosi Sun Kosi Investigation (JPO-SKSKI) was opened in August 2004 with India’s grant support of NCRs 46.8 crores. Sadly the SKSKI joint project offices are in Nepal only with none in India. It is being argued how Nepal will be able to assess the “acrimonious” downstream benefits (flood control and irrigation) without having a single office in India to gather all the required data. Instead, India successfully included the studies of multipurpose projects on Kamala and Bagmati despite weak protests from Nepal that social and environmental problems exist due to presence of large settlements in the reservoir areas. Some argue that it is not the multipurpose projects on Kamala and Bagmati that India is interested in. It is actually the hydrological data of Kamala and Bagmati basins that India badly wants.

d) Sapta Kosi High Dam and India’s River Linking Project: These data are for her ambitious IC Rs 5,600 billion River Linking Project whose 14 Himalayan components has five major Nepal related links: i) Kosi - Mechi ii) Kosi – Ghagra (Karnali) iii)Gandak - Ganga iv)Ghagra (Karnali) - Yamuna and v)Sarada (Mahakali) – Yamuna. India’s near double digit galloping GDP growth has developed an insatiable appetite for energy. But many in Nepal forget to correlate this with an equally insatiable appetite for freshwater. The Ganga basin is populated by 43% of India’s burgeoning 1,027 million people. With Nepal’s glacial-fed rivers contributing an astounding 75% of the lean season Ganga flow at Farakka, India’s long term water strategy in the Ganga basin hinges squarely on Nepal. But so far India has astutely played down the value of water and Nepal unfortunately has been mesmerized for the last five decades by electricity exports. For these 14 Links to function, India badly needs storage projects on all the major, medium and minor rivers of Nepal: from Kankai, Kosi, Kamala, Bagmati, Gandaki, West Rapti/Naumure, Babai, Karnali, Mahakali down to Danda, Mahali Sagar etc. The Sapta Kosi-Ghagra Link passes through seven heavily populated Nepalese districts (Udaypur, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi and Rautahat) before emerging near Gaur in India. However, India, continues to insist that the proposed River Linking Project is “still being examined in India. We will consult Nepal when this becomes necessary.”

vi. Issues for Nepal:

Unquestionably, India’s solution to floods and water scarcity lies up in the hills of Nepal. If India wants large interventions on Nepalese rivers then she must concede that stored and regulated water has monetary value. India must stop the oft-repeated arguments that Nepal’s water would, at any rate, flow down to India. This could no longer be the case with the dry season flows as the usage increases upstream. India has painstakingly avoided spelling out her real water interests to Nepal. On the other hand, Nepal has been lulled into believing that export of electricity “at mutually agreed price” would lead her to prosperity. The three agreements, 1954 (revised 1966) Kosi, 1959 (amended 1964) Gandak and 1996 Mahakali, are examples of India achieving by default her strategic water interests from Nepal.

On the DPR preparation of the Indo-Nepal Sapta Kosi High Dam Multipurpose Project-cum-Sun Kosi Kamala Diversion Scheme, the following issues need to be transparently debated and vetted: submergence of 50.2 sq. kms of Nepal’s limited fertile lands up to the tip of Tumlingtar airfield, displacement of about 75,000 Nepalese mostly for the benefit of people across the border in India, the non-acrimonious meaning of “all benefits accruing to both parties….in the forms of flood control, irrigation, power etc. shall be assessed”, the interpretation of price of electricity “shall be mutually agreed” as opposed to the power benefit assessed on the basis of savings in costs as compared with the relevant alternatives available, cost of the Project in proportion to the benefits accrued etc. No doubt these are important issues. But it is about time that Nepal also vet: whether this Sapta Kosi High Dam is truly beneficial for Nepal or not, what really happens to the 199 years Kosi Agreement where Nepal has all water rights over Kosi within her territory with India getting the “balance at the barrage site”, are our prevailing laws suitable for such large multipurpose projects, what are the practices in India’s own multipurpose projects like the recently commissioned Tehri/Uttaranchal and Sardar Sarovar/Gujarat dams, who will operate the Kosi High Dam and its associated structures (India as in the Kosi Barrage or the River Authority/Commission that was conceptualized on the border straddled Pancheshwar project) and what is the international practice etc. These are issues that Nepal’s concerned institutions should mull and vet over before the political storm akin to that of the midnight ratification of “Mahakali Package” hits them without really knowing from where and who.

vii. Kosi Agreement in Retrospect:

Though belatedly, the New Nepal of 2008 have begun to assess what she, in comparison with India, exactly got from the Kosi agreement. It is reported that India has “leased” for the Kosi project about15,000 bighas (9,375 hectares) of Nepalese lands of which 10,000 bighas of land owners, despite the operation of the barrage since 1962, have still to receive compensation. Even the land tax to Nepal at “the Nominal rate” is reported to be unpaid over a long period. This is a slur not only on India but Nepal as well for being both deaf and mute. The 66,000 ha Chatara irrigation in Sunsari and Morang had to be retrofitted with the US$ 155 Million loan from World Bank to irrigate only 41,800 ha. The farmers of Saptari, 13,800 ha through costly pumping and 11,300 ha through gravity flow, get erratic water supply due to non-maintenance of water level on the main Western Canal. India has been ceaselessly bandying the term “concessional Kosi power” to Nepal for a mere 18.8 million units per annum which she finds “unsustainable” to supply. India wants this “concessional Kosi tariff” to be made at par with the higher power exchange rate. Despite Nepal’s repeated requests, as per the agreement, to have the 6 km road on either side of Kosi barrage maintained, India never complied. Ultimately, when Nepal decided to maintain this barrage road herself through the Asian Development Bank loan, India demurred that she had no objection if the contract is awarded to her Indian firm. It was the Indian public sector firm, Indian Railways Construction, that did India’s job but at Nepal’s cost.

The Kosi eastern and western canal irrigates 978,100 hectares of land in India while Nepal gets a mere 11,300 hectares through gravity flow. The barrage and the accompanying structures all in Nepal have provided India valuable flood control and irrigation benefits. It is, thus, Nepal that has provided valuable “concessions” to India. Yet Nepal has failed miserably to articulate them. Ridiculously, India still contends “no advantage for Nepal if barrage was built in India”. India now terms the sediment filled Kosi barrage a “joint asset” to be protected by the proposed Sapta Kosi High Dam. The DPR of this Kosi High Dam is jointly under study with several Joint Project Offices in Nepal but none in India. The Kosi High Dam has roped in both the Kamala and Bagmati basin studies for India’s River Linking Project. While India gets the relevant hydrological and other data for the three major river basins, Nepal with no offices in India will have no relevant Indian data when negotiations on the “accrued benefits” begin.

India’s former Water Resources Secretary, Ramaswamy Iyer states “The Kosi/Gandak agreements were not regarded as exercises in ‘regional cooperation’”. He admits of “occasional blunders and stupidities by India” and stresses that “India, as the bigger country, must go more than halfway in seeking to build good relations with the smaller neighbours.” It is amazing that 70 year old Kapileshwar Majhi of Bharda, like many others affected by Kosi project, is still waiting to be compensated in 2007 for his 31 bighas of land that the Kosi project “leased” in the late 1950s. If such “blunders and stupidities” persist and New Nepal’s political masters fail to handle the Sapta Kosi High Dam with care and wisdom, then one can say with certainty that Kosi, the “Sorrow of Bihar”, is destined to transform into the “Sorrow of Nepal”!

End

Writer’s Postscript:

It is always easy to get wise later. But one can discern that the Bihar Government’s Water Resources Department (under whose jurisdiction the Kosi Barrage falls) appears to have failed to comprehend the magnitude of the Koshi-embankment-breach disaster. Had the Department foreseen that, even at the penultimate moment, then timely mobilization of an army of dumper trucks, excavators, bull dozers etc. may have prevented that breaching it is reported that such equipments were used in the 1993 flood. Fortunately, the discharge of the Koshi river at the time of the breaching was only one lakh forty six thousands cusecs. Previous records at the barrage have discharges as high as nine lakh cusecs. It took nearly a week for the Bihar Government to comprehend that the Kosi had changed its course.

(Footnotes)

Dr. AB Thapa was formerly Executive Secretary of Water and Energy Commission Secretariate.

Mishra, DK. 2004. Bihar: Flooded and Waterlogged. B Subba and K Pradhan edited Disputes over the Ganga. Panos Institute South Asia. Kathmandu.

The Indian Embassy, through its August 19, 2008 press release, launched a blistering media blitzkrieg in Nepal’s tv, radio, newspapers and journalists charging Nepal’s Sunsari administration of non-cooperation in its attempts to strengthen the spurs and conveying the ‘gravity of the situation’ on 17 th August, 2008. The breach occurred the very next day on August 18, 2008 that very day.

Dr. Thapa, AB. Gatherings to Mark Disaster Prevention Day and Kosi River. Spotlight January 12, 2007.

This desperation was again exhibited by India on the Tanakpur barrage. The famous December 1991 MOU, that an unwary Prime Minister GP Koirala signed, was a master stroke to legitimize the unilaterally constructed barrage and race against the oncoming monsoon to tie the barrage’s left embankment to Nepal’s high ground..

Partnership in Economic Development, An Enquiry into the Indian Aid Policy to Nepal. 2005. BP Koirala India Nepal Foundation, Embassy of India, Lainchour, Kathmandu

Comprehensive Plan of Flood Control for the Kosi Sub-basin . December 1983. Ganga Flood Control Commission, Ministry of Irrigation, Government of India.

Rose Leo E. 1971. Nepal Strategy for Survival. Bombay: John Brown, Oxford University Press, Regents of the University of California.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mihaly, EB. 1965. Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs

Iyer, RR. Conflict Resolution: Three River Treaties. Mumbai: Economic and Political Weekly June 12, 1999

Bhasin , AS. 1994 Nepal’s Relations with India and China. New Delhi: SIBA EXIM PVT. LTD

Op. cit. Footnote 11. Mihaly gives Hal Khabar, 21 June 1959 as his reference.

One tends to conclude that, like his ill-informed half-brother Prime Minister GP Koirala on the Tanakpur MOU in December 1991, MP Koirala must have also been very little informed on the Kosi Project. Jagat Mehta, India’s ex-foreign Secretary, also makes the same observation – footnote 16.

Mehta, Jagat S. India and Nepal Relations: A Victim of Politics. India-Nepal Relations. 2004. Observer Research Foundation. New Delhi: Rupa & Co.

Partnership in Economic Development, An Enquiry into the Indian Aid Policy to Nepal. 2005. BP Koirala India Nepal Foundation, Embassy of India, Lainchour, Kathmandu

Malla, SK. 1995. Case Study of Kosi and Gandak Projects. Water Resources Development Nepalese Perspectives. Delhi: Konark Publishers

Ibid.

Ibid.

Op. cit. Footnote 16

Mihaly, EB. 1965. Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Mihaly gives Hal Khabar, 14 June 1959 as his reference.

Poudel, Somnath. BS 2059. Nepal ma Sinchai. Kathmandu: Jalshrot Vikas Sansthan

When a Nep

alese engineer at Chatara project complained to the visiting Indian ambassador about this excessive silt in the canals, the ambassador condescendingly quipped, ‘Canal ka niche balu nahi hota to, kya sona milta?’ – as related by BK Pradhan, former Secretary/MOWR.

The Project cost figure of US$ 155 million is from the World Bank’s Project Completion Reports.

Op. cit. Footnote 18.

The Bank’s Operational Policy OP 7.50. T he World Bank did notify China.

Partnership in Economic Development, An Enquiry into the Indian Aid Policy to Nepal. 2005. BP Koirala India Nepal Foundation, Embassy of India, Lainchour, Kathmandu

Signed on 19 th December 1966 by Dr. YP Pant/Secretary, Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance/HMGN and Shriman Narayan, Ambassador of India.

Purba Prashasak ka Samjhana ka Goretoharu. 2003. Collected by Dwarikanath Dhungel. IIDS Kathmandu.

Mehta, Jagat S. India and Nepal Relations: A Victim of Politics. India-Nepal Relations. 2004. Observer Research Foundation. New Delhi: Rupa & Co.

BP Koirala’s Atmabrittanta. 2001. Himal Books. In fact, BP was hot happy with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for not acknowledging this arms supply. He admits meeting India’s RAW chief, Kaw.

Partnership in Economic Development, An Enquiry into the Indian Aid Policy to Nepal. 2005. BP Koirala India Nepal Foundation, Embassy of India, Lainchour, Kathmandu

Ibid.

DK Mishra. 1990. Badh se Trasht – Sinchai se Pasht. Patna. Samta Publication.

Record of Discussion between MG Padhye, Secretary/Irrigation, GOI and Madhusudan Dhakal, Secretary/MOWR, HMGN at Kathmandu from 19 th to 24 th April 1983,

Pande, BB. BS 2038. Tes Bakhat ko Nepal. Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Saian Studies/TU.

Bhadrapur, Siraha, Jaleshwar/Janakpur, Gaur, Raxual/Birgunj, Bhairawa, Krishnanagar, Nepalgunj etc.

Kasi Raj Pande was General Manager of Morang Hydroelectric Company that supplied power to Biratnagar.

Power System Master Plan for Nepal, Generation Expansion Plan, Feb. 1998, Norconsult study for ADB/NEA

Karnali/Chisapani, Kaligandaki – 1, Kaligandaki – 2, Trisulganga, Seti, Sapta Kosi and Pancheshwar

Bhasin , AS. 1994 Nepal’s Relations with India and China. New Delhi: SIBA EXIM PVT. LTD

Some believe t his so called cheap Chatara-Kursela-Kolkata navigation may end up in the same manner that the much trumpeted World Bank financed Sirsiya/Birgunj dry dock that boasted of 40% cost reduction in the Birgunj-Kolkata transportation.

India and Nepal Partnership in Economic Development: An Enquiry into the Indian Aid Policy to Nepal . published by BP Koirala India Nepal Foundation, Embassy of India, Lainchaur, Kathmandu. July 2005.

Shyam Saran/India’s ambassador to Nepal, talking to the Media on July 9, 2004. Spotlight July 16, 2004

Subba, B. Water, Nepal and India. 2002. State of Nepal. Kathmandu. Dixit KM and Shastri R. Himal Books

Dixit, Ajaya. Uchcha Bandh le Uthaye ko Prasna. Mulyankan 2062, Chaitra/46

Kantipur Magh 1, 2063 (January 15, 2007) quoting the Land Acquisition Office, Kosi Project/Biratnagar

In fact, so exasperated was Ambika Pd Upadhay, Nepal’s Bharda based Road Department Engineer, that he wrote a letter to the Indian Embassy with a copy to the President of the Republic of India about non-compliance of the Indo-Nepal Kosi Agreement regarding the barrage road maintenance. The Engineer earned “Ainda yasto nagarnu” from his Department.

Iyer, RR. Conflict Resolution: Three River Treaties. Mumbai: Economic and Political Weekly June 12, 1999

Kantipur Magh 1, 2063 (January 15, 2007)

Kantipur Report

KATHMANDU, Sept 4 - The government on Thursday allocated 2.5 billion rupees for the relief and housing of the people displaced by the Koshi floods.

Accepting the report tabled by the commission formed to draft plans for the relief and immediate housing of the flood-affected people, a cabinet meeting at the Prime Minister’s office in Singha Durbar today took the decision to allocate the amount and immediately release rupees 500 million.

“The relief distribution and resettlement programmes will be carried out under the ministries of Home Affairs, Health and Education, Physical Planning and Works,” said Minister for Information and Communications Krishna Bahadur Mahara.

“We have passed the report tabled by the commission deciding to immediately release rupees 500 million to start the resettlement work as per the report which would be carried out in three phases,’ Mahara added.

Likewise, the cabinet has set up a three-member central committee led by Deputy Prime Minster Bam Dev Gautam to monitor the relief distribution and housing programmes.

“Today’s cabinet meeting formed a three-member committee comprising the Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister and Minister for Physical Planning and Woks that will initiate the work,” said Health Minster Giri Raj Mani Pokhrel.

Also today, the government declared seven VDCs of the Sunsari district affected by the Saptakoshi deluge as ‘emergency zones’.
Western Kushaha, Shripur, Randeep Basantapur, Haripur Laukahi, BoKraha, Madhuban Narshing and Bhardaha VDCs have been declared ‘emergency zones’.

The central monitoring committee is due to form local monitoring committees for the relief and resettlement in the VDCs.

Meanwhile, the cabinet meeting also decided to accept the assistance of rupees six billion proposed by the European Union.

The government decision aims at ensuring maximum utilisation of available resources for the benefit of flood-victims, bringing life-line infrastructures in flood-hit areas back to normal and facilitating livelihood activities for the displaced people.
The Home Ministry on Wednesday forwarded a proposal to declare nine VDCs -- four highly affected VDCs, five others adjoining those-- and Inaruwa Municipality as 'emergency areas' till mid-July next year to run special programmes of relief and rehabilitation.

ऋषिकेश दाहाल/भीम घिमिरे

जतिखेर १० ट्रक तारजालीसहित बिहार, सुपोलका डिस्टि्रक मजिस्ट्रेट सरिफ आलमको टोली सुनसरीको जुदगन्ज आइपुग्यो, त्यतिखेर श्रीपुर र पश्चिम कुसाहमा कोलाहल सुरु भइसकेको थियो । मानिसहरू वस्तुभाउ पर्ूवतिर लखेट्दै थिए भने बस्तीहरू रित्तिने क्रम बढिरहेको थियो । ट्रक, ट्याक्टर जे पाइन्छ, त्यसमै चढ्दै कोसीपारि जानेको भीड पनि उत्तिकै थियो ।

अरूबेला र्सवसाधारणलाई निषेध गरनिे कोसीटप्पु वन्यजन्तु आरक्षतिर सेनाको रोकटोक थिएन । झन्डै छ घन्टाको तनावकै क्रममा भदौ २ गते मध्यान्ह १२ बजेर ५० मिनेट जा“दा कोसीको तटबन्ध फुट्यो । बाढी आउने डरले अघिल्लो रातभर नसुती बसेका गाउ“लेहरू बस्ती छोड्दै भाग्ने क्रम त बढ्यो नै, तटबन्ध मर्मतका लागि आएको भारतीय टोली पनि सामानसहित गाडी कुदाउ“दै भारततिरै फर्कियो ।
तटबन्ध भत्किन थालेलगत्तै कोसी ब्यारेजका ५६ मध्ये ५४ वटा ढोका पूरै खोलिए । तर पनि त्यो दिन पानीको चापमा कुनै कमी आएन । त्यसको ठीक एक दिनअघि नै ब्यारेज हर्ेर्ने चिफ इन्जिनियर सत्यनारायणलाई भारतको गङ्गा बाढ नियन्त्रण विभागले फिर्ता बोलाइसकेको थियो । बाढीले प्रभावित पार्ने अवस्थासम्म पनि ब्यारेजको ढोका नखोली गम्भीर त्रुटि गरेका कारण उनलाई विभागले फिर्ता बोलाएको थियो ।

प्राविधिकहरूका अनुसार पानीको चाप बढ्दा पनि ब्यारेजका ढोका नखोलिएको र तटबन्धको मर्मत समयमा नै हुन नसकेकाले पानीको पर्ूवतिर धकेलिने क्रम बढ्यो र ब्यारेजभन्दा ठीक १२ किलोमिटरमाथिको तटबन्ध भत्कियो । आखिर ब्यारेजको ढोका किन समयमा नै खोलिएन त  - ब्यारेजमाथि पर्ूण्ा नियन्त्रण राख्ने भारतीय पक्ष यसबारे मौन छ । "अहिलेको अवस्था भनेको कसरी क्षति कम गराउने भन्ने हो," भारतको केन्द्रीय सरकारको निर्देशनमा नेपाल आएको गङ्गा बाढ नियन्त्रण विभागका एक्जुकेटिभ इन्जिनियर जेएन सिंह भन्छन्, "अहिलेको समय कसको कारण घटना भयो भन्नेभन्दा पनि अब के गर्ने भन्ने हो ।"

भारतको कोसी परयिोजना आफ्ना कमजोरी ढाकछोप गर्न खोजिरहेको छ । उसले घटनाको ठीक एक दिन अगाडि शान्ति सुरक्षाको अभावका कारण मर्मतका कार्य थाल्न नसकेको पत्र जिल्ला प्रशासन कार्यालय सुनसरीलाई बुझाउने प्रयास गरेको थियो ।

परयिोजनाले आफूलेे दिएको पत्र जिल्ला प्रशासन कार्यालय सुनसरीले नबुझेको आरोप लगाएको छ । त्यसपछि परयिोजनाले सर्म्पर्क तथा भूआर्जन कार्यालय विराटनगरमा गएर हिन्दीबाट पत्रको नेपालीकरण गराएको थियो । भदौ १ गते कोसी परयिोजनको शर्ीष्ा कार्य मण्डलका एक्जुकेटिभ इन्जिनियर अवधेश कुमारको नाममा लेखिएको उक्त पत्रमा मूलतः तीन विषयलाई जोड दिइएको छ ः
० तटबन्ध मर्मतमा मजदुर व्यवधान हटाउनुपर्ने,
० मर्मत कार्यमा आरक्षका सेनाको सहयोग हुनुपर्ने,
० तटबन्ध कटान भइरहेका स्थानमा त्यहा“का बोटबिरुवा काटेर कटान रोक्न आरक्षले मद्दत गर्नुपर्ने ।
पत्रमा भारतीय पक्षले तटबन्ध मर्मतमा नेपाली मजदूरहरूले अवरोध पुर्‍याउ“दै आएको आरोप लगाएको मात्र छैन, नेपाली सेनाले समेत असहयोग गरेको उल्लेख छ । तर, सेनाले यसलाई पर्ूण्ातः गलत बताएको छ । भारतीय पक्षले सेनाले उसको अभ्यास क्षेत्र भएकाले काम गर्न अवरोध गरेको आरोप लगाएको छ । तर, सेनाले तटबन्धको छेउमा त्यसप्रकारको गतिविधि नहुने दाबी गरेको छ । भारतीय पक्षले लगाएको आरोपमध्ये मजदुरको अवरोध र तारजाली चोरी हुने घटना भने कोसी क्षेत्रमा नौलो होइन । तटबन्धको जालीसमेत काटेर चोरी हु“दै आएको स्थानीय बताउ“छन् । यसको पछिल्लो उदाहरण हो, भदौ १ गतेको चोरी । त्यस दिन दर्ुइ हजार बालुवाका बोरा र ६० वटा तारजाली कोसी ब्यारेजनजिकै लुटिएको थियो । नया“ तार जाली मात्र होइन, यसअघि नै लगाइसकिएको तटबन्धका जाली र बोरासमेत चोरी भएका दर्जनभन्दा बढी उजुरीहरू सर्म्पर्क तथा भूआर्जन कार्यालयमा दर्ता छन् ।

सङ्केत विपत्तिको
कुनै पनि विपत्ति घन्टी बजाएर आउ“दैन । तर, सप्तकोसी धारको चलायमान स्वरूप भने नौलो थिएन । कोसीलाई 'बिहारको पीडा' भन्नुको पछाडि कुनै कारण थियो भने, त्यो कोसीले क्षति पुर्‍याउन सक्छ नै भन्ने हो । त्यति मात्र होइन, तीन महिनाअघि भारतीय विशेषज्ञको टोलीले कोसीले आफ्नो धार पश्चिमबाट पर्ूवतर्फबदल्दै गरेको प्रतिवेदन दिएको थियो ।
प्रतिवेदनमा कुनै पनि समय तटबन्ध फुट्न सक्ने हुनाले त्यसको सुरक्षामा विशेष ध्यान दिन सुझावसमेत दिइएको थियो ।

टोलीले भू-उपग्रहबाट लिइएको चित्रका आधारमा यस्तो सङ्केत दिएको थियो । तर, त्यो चेतावनीमाथि बिहार सरकार मौन रह्यो र समयमै काम थालेन । नेपालका तर्फाट पनि भारतलाई सचेत गराउने कुनै पहल भएन । फलस्वरूप जतिखेर तटबन्धको काम सुरु भयोे, त्यतिबेलासम्म धेरै ढिलो भइसकेको थियो ।
कोसी तटबन्धभित्रको भू-भाग बालुवाका कारण बाहिरको भन्दा अग्लो हुन पुगेकाले पनि तटबन्ध फोड्नेबित्तिकै कोसीको पूरै भङ्गालो बाहिरनिे खतरा विशेषज्ञ टोलीले औ“ल्याएको थियो । तर, कोसी परयिोजनाले साउन ३२ गते मात्र पर्ूर्वी तटबन्धको स्पर नं १२१० र १२१९ आरडी कटानमा परेकाले आवश्यक सहयोग गर्न नेपाललाई अनुरोध गरेबाट पनि भारतीयहरू धेरै ढिलो भएको प्रस्टिन्छ । श्रीपुर-८ जुदगन्जका मोहम्मद हारुन, ३५, भन्छन्, "आठ वर्षघि तटबन्ध फुट्ने हल्ला हु“दा लालुप्रसाद यादव आफै“ हर्ेन आएका थिए । अहिले यस्तो अवस्था भइसक्दा पनि भारतबाट कोही आएन ।"
कोसीको मूलधार पर्ूवतिर पसेपछि नेपाल मात्र डुबानको समस्यामा परेन, कोसी ब्यारेजलाई अनुगमन गर्ने भारतको वीरपुरमा रहेको कोसी परयिोजना आफ“ै पनि डुबेको छ । पश्चिम कुसाहका नादिर महमद भन्छन्, "पानीको मात्रा बढेकाले पर्ूवतिर पस्छ कि भन्नेचाहि“ थियो तर तटबन्ध नै तोड्ला भन्ने लागेको थिएन ।"
यसअघि सन् १९८७ मा ब्यारेजभन्दा ४० किलोमिटर तल भारततर्फचन्द्रायण भन्ने ठाउ“मा कोसीको तटबन्ध फुटेको थियो । तर, अहिलेजति विनासकारी थिएन । लगानीको आधार मात्र हर्ेर्ने हो भने पनि समयमा नै मर्मत भएको भए २५ देखि ३० लाख रुपिया“मा तटबन्ध मर्मत हुनसक्ने प्राविधिकहरूको अनुमान छ । तर, समयमा त्यत्ति लगानी नगर्दा अर्बौ रुपिया“ले थेग्न नसक्ने क्षति भएको छ । सुनसरीका मात्रै ३५ हजार बासिन्दा डुबानका कारण विस्थापित भएका छन् ।
आव २०६१/६२ मा नेपालतर्फमात्र कोसीको तटबन्ध मर्मतका लागि १४ हजार र आव ०६२/६३ मा १३ हजार घनमिटर ढुङ्गा निकासी भएका थिए । तर, ०६३/६४ मा पा“च हजार र गत आर्थिक वर्षा छ हजार घनमिटर ढुङ्गा मात्र प्रयोग गरएिको छ । ढुङ्गा प्रयोगको दरमा आएको कमी कटान रोक्न प्रयोग हुने जालीमा पनि लागू हुन्छ ।

यो त तटबन्ध मर्मतमा भारतले देखाएको उदासिनताको एउटा सानो नमुना मात्र हो । श्रीपुर जुदगन्जका इद्रिस मिया भन्छन्, "पहिले-पहिले ब्यारेज र तटबन्धको छेउमा ढुङ्गाका थुप्राहरू हुन्थे । एक-दर्ुइ वर्षता केही राखिन्नन् ।" कोसी सम्झौता अनुसार नेपाल सरकारले तटबन्धमा प्रयोग हुने ढुङ्गाहरूमा लाग्ने कर छूट दिन्छ भने ती ढुङ्गामाटो नेपालबाट नै उपलब्ध गराइन्छ ।
पर्ूर्वी कोसी तटबन्ध वीरपुरका एक्जुकेटिभ इन्जिनियर सुखदेव राम भने कामका बेला ज्याला वृद्धिको माग गर्दै भएका आन्दोलन, सेनाको फायरङि् अभ्यासजस्ता कार्यले समयमा नै काम हुन नसकेको तर्क अघि र्सार्छन् । भन्छन्, "नेपालतर्फो भन्सारले तटबन्ध रोक्न लगाइएका सामान बेलैमा छोड्दैन । स्थानीयले तार-जाली र खाली बोरा लुट्छन् ।" यस्ता समस्याबारे सुनसरी जिल्ला प्रशासनलाई लिखित जानकारी पठाएको उनको भनाई छ । तर, स्थानीय र प्रशासन दुवै भारतीय भनाइ मान्न तयार छैनन् । पश्चिम कुसाहका टेकनारायण यादव भन्छन्, "५० वटा जाली चाहिने ठाउ“मा दर्ुइवटा जाली लिएर आउ“छन् अनि विरोध गर्दा नेपालीले काम गर्न दिएनन् भन्छन् ।"
त्यसो त कोसी नियन्त्रणका लागि नेपाल-भारत उच्चस्तरीय समितिले हरेक वर्षो जून १५ देखि अक्टोबर १५ सम्मलाई 'बाढीको अवधि' भनेर किटान गरेको छ । त्यसबाहेकको अवधि भनेको अनुगमन र मर्मतमा खर्चनुपर्ने व्यवस्था छ । बाढीको भन्दा बा“की रहेको अवधिमा नै त्यस वर्षो बाढीले के कति असर पार्‍यो - अर्को वर्षके कति प्रभाव पार्न सक्छ - त्यसको लागत तयार गर्छ, समितिले । समितिले गरेको सिफारसिकै आधारमा कोसीको बाढी नियन्त्रणमा राख्न दिल्ली सरकारले बजेट छुट्याउ“छ ।
कोसी सन्धि अनुसार कोसी ब्यारेज पर्ूण्ातः भारतीय नियन्त्रण र रेखदेखमा रहने भए पनि त्यसले पार्ने प्रभाव र नियन्त्रणको विषयमा नेपाली पक्षसमेत सामेल हु“दै आएको छ । त्यसै आधारमा पनि सम्भावित कटानबारे नेपाली पक्षले आवाज उठाउनुपर्ने थियो, जुन भएन । अझ त्यसमाथि कोसीको बाढीले पार्नसक्ने अहिलेको जस्तो राष्ट्रिय सङ्कटप्रति पनि नेपाली पक्ष सजग हुनुपर्ने थियो ।

अर्कोतिर कोसीले पारेको र पार्न सक्नेबारे हुने अनुगमन हिउ“दमा हुन्छ, जतिखेर कोसीको पानी र बहाव दुवै कम हुन्छ । स्थानीयका अनुसार अहिलेसम्म पटनाबाट जेजति समूहहरू अनुगमनका लागि कोसी आए, ती सबै सुक्खा सिजनमा मात्र आए ।
त्यसैले यतिखेर कोसी ब्यारेजका सबैजसो ढोका खुला छन् तर कोसीमा पानी कम छ । पश्चिमी भागमा बालुवा बढेको देखिन्छ भने ब्यारेजका ढोका पानीको सतहभन्दा दर्ुइ मिटर माथिसम्म खाली छन् । ब्यारेजबाट ल्याइएको पानीबाट चल्ने कटैया पावर हाउसको विद्युत् उत्पादन ठप्प भएको छ । बाढीका कारण होइन, पानी नभएर र्टबाइन घुम्न सकेको छैन । कोसीले धार फेरेकै कारण भारतका अररयिा, मधेपुरा, सुपोल र सहर्सर्ााजल्ला जलमग्न भएका छन्, जसबाट २० लाख भारतीय प्रभावित हुन पुगेका छन् । कोसीमाथि भारतीय प्राविधिकहरूको त्रुटिले जति क्षति नेपालमा पार्‍यो, त्यसभन्दा बढी उसैले बेहोर्नुपर्ने प्रस्टै छ । किनभने, कोसी ब्यारेजबाट १ सय २५ किलोमिटर पार गरेपछि मात्र यो नदी गङ्गामा मिसिन्छ । नदीको धार फेरएिपछि यसले असर पार्ने क्षेत्रको लम्बाइ नदीको लम्बाइजत्तिकै पनि हुनसक्छ ।

दर्ुइ धारमा सप्तकोसी
सन् १९५३ मा भारत सरकारले कोसी ब्यारेज निर्माण गर्ने निर्ण्र्ाागरेको थियो । एक वर्षछि नै नेपाल सरकारले १९५४ मा व्यारेज निर्माणको स् वीकृति दियो । ३० अप्रिल १९५९ मा तत्कालीन राजा महेन्द्रले ब्यारेजको उद्घाटन गरेका थिए । त्यसको चार वर्षछि ३१ म्ाार्च १९६३ देखि कोसीको धारलाई मोडेर ब्यारेजको ढोकाबाट पठाउने क्रम सुरु भयो ।
अहिले दर्ुइ किलोमिटर तटबन्ध भत्किएर पानी पर्ूवतर्फलागेको छ । ब्यारेजबाट १२ किलोमिटर माथि कोसीले पहिलो दिन २ सय ७० मिटर तटबन्ध फुटायो । त्यसको १५ घन्टापछि अर्को तीन सय मिटर लामो तटबन्ध ढाल्यो । एक साताको अन्तरमा तीन सय मिटरकै एक अर्को तटबन्ध ढाल्यो । अझै पनि तटबन्धहरू ढल्ने क्रम जारी छ ।
प्राविधिकहरू कोसी अहिले दर्ुइ सय वर्षघिको बाटो भएर बगिरहेको बताउ“छन् । तर, अहिलेसम्म दर्ुइ किलोमिटर तटबन्ध ढल्दा सप्तकोसीको दर्ुइवटा धार बनेको छ ।

एउटा धार पहिलेकै बाटोमा छ भने दोस्रो धार पनि तीन भागमा विभाजित छ । सबैभन्दा ठूलो धार कोसी टप्पु वन्यजन्तु आरक्ष प्रवेशद्वार नजिकै छ । यो अहिलेको सबैभन्दा ठूलो धार हो । यसले झन्डै आधा किलोमिटर सडकलाई पल्टाएर आफ्नो बाटो बनाएको छ । त्यसको पा“च सय मिटर पर्ूवतिर अर्को धार बनेको छ, जसले सडकको ५० मिटर दूरी कटान गरेको छ ।
कोसीले सा“च्चै आफ्नो धार परविर्तन गरेको हो भने पा“च सय मिटरको समानान्तर दूरीमा नदीहरू एउटै हुनेछन् । किनभने, दुवैले सडक कटान गर्ने क्रम जारी छ । यसबाहेक पानीको मात्रा पश्चिम कुसाहमा बढ्दै गएपछि लौकहीमा सडक चिरेर पानी कटान गरएिको छ । लौकही कोसी ब्यारेजबाट झन्डै १५ किलोमिटरको दूरीमा पर्छ ।
वषर्ायाममा कोसीमा तीनदेखि चार लाख क्युसेकसम्म जलप्रवाह हुने गर्छ । पर्ूर्वी तटबन्ध कटान भएपछि नदीको जलप्रवाह १ लाख ६८ हजार क्युसेक मात्र कायम रह्यो, कोसी ब्यारेजमा । कोसीमा प्रवाह हुने पानीको ठूलो मात्रा पर्ूवतिर लागेकाले पनि नदीले आफ्नो दिशा परविर्तन गरेको अनुमान छ । कोसी नदीमा सबभन्दा बढी जलप्रवाह सन् १९६८ को ५ अगस्तमा ९ लाख १३ हजार क्युसेक पुगेको थियो ।

अब के त -
बाढीको प्रभाव अत्यधिक भएपछि दिल्ली सरकारले नै कोसी परयिोजनाबाहेक बेग्लै टोली पठाएको छ, सुनसरीमा । चिफ इन्जिनियर एन सन्यालको नेतृत्वमा आएको टोलीले सामना गरेको यो सबैभन्दा जटिल र ठूलो समस्या हो । टोलीमा चिफ इन्जिनियर रामप्रसाद राम, सुपरीटेन्डेन्ट इन्जिनियर एसबी राम र एक्जुकेटिभ इन्जिनियर जेएन सिंह संलग्न छन् । टोलीमा भारतका विभिन्न तटबन्धहरूमा काम गरसिकेका प्राविधिकहरू भए पनि यति ठूलो विनासकारी क्षेत्र उनीहरू नया“ नै हो ।
टोलीलाई राजमार्ग छिटो सञ्चालन गर्नेर् र क्षति घटाउने प्राथमिक कार्यदायरा तोकिएको छ । टोलीले यसै साता दर्ुइवटा र्सर्वेक्षण थाल्नेछ । पहिलो आकाशबाट गर्ने एरयिल र्सर्वे -गर्ने) र दोस्रो स्थलगत र्सर्वे । त्यस आधारमा नै नदीको 'अप स्टि्रम' र 'डाउन स्टि्रम'मा उनीहरूले काम थाल्ने छन् ताकि नदीले गररिहेको कटान रोकियोस् ।

तर, वषर्ा नघटी प्रभावकारी काम हुन नसक्ने निष्कर्षा पुगिसकेका छन्, भारतीय प्राविधिकहरू । "सबैखाले अध्ययनपछि हामी अल्पकालीन र दर्ीघकालीन आयोजनाहरू सञ्चालनमा ल्याउ“छौ“," टोली सदस्य जेएन सिंहले नेपालस“ग भने, "दिल्ली सरकार चिन्तित छ, त्यसैले पूरै शक्ति लगाएर काम गररिहेका छौ“ ।" तर, डुबानका कारण भारत र नेपालको सीमासमेत छुट्याउन सकिने अवस्था छैन ।
कोसी सम्झौता अनुसार डुबानले पार्ने प्रभावको क्षतिपर्ूर्ति भारत सरकारले बेहोर्नुपर्ने हो । यसअघि ०४८ सालमा कोसीले हनुमाननगर कटान गर्दा त्यस क्षेत्रमा भारतले स्थायी जग्गाको मुआब्जा, बालीको क्षति, घर, रूख, पोखरीको मूल्याङ्कन गरेर सम्झौता अनुसार क्षतिपर्ूर्ति तिरेको थियो । तर, यसपटक कति क्षति भएको छ त - कसैस“ग जवाफ छैन । अहिलेसम्मका तथ्याङ्कहरू अनुमानमै आधारति छन् । तटबन्ध फुटेको एक साता पूरा भइसक्दा पनि कतिपय स्थानमा उद्धारकर्मीसमेत पुग्न सकेका छैनन् । तटबन्ध फुटेको चौथो दिन उद्धारमा गएको नेपाल प्रहरीको एक टोली नदीको भेलका कारण भारत पुगेको थियो । लगाएको बालीदेखि घरघडेरीको मूल्याङ्कन गर्नसमेत पानीको बहावले अवरोध सिर्जना गरेको छ ।
सप्तकोसीलाई ब्यारेजतिर सोझ्याउन पर्ूर्वी तटबन्धतर्फभन्टाबारीदेखि चक्रघट्टीसम्म ३२ किलोमिटरमा ४५ वटा स्पर -कटान रोक्न बनाइएको माटो र ढुङ्गाको ढिस्को) बनाइएका छन् भने पश्चिमी तटबन्धतर्फभारदहबाट पथरीसम्म १२ किलोमिटरमा १५ वटा स्पर बनाइएका छन्, त्यसको अवस्थातर्फ ध्यान पुगेको छैन । तटबन्धको मर्मतमा देखिएको उदासीनता हर्ेर्ने हो भने अब यी सबै स्परहरूको अवस्था नबुझी समस्या समाधान गर्न सकि“दैन ।
(लीलाबल्लभ घिमिरेको सहयोगमा)